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The departure point for this investigation is to highlight the centrality of regulation theory as a praxis in planning enforcement. The
value of the conceptual framework is demonstrated by application in the problematic arena of conservation regulatory compliance,
where there is currently a dearth of investigation. It is evidenced that this thematic approach provides a lens to scrutinise
problematic areas of control and provides a deeper understanding of the diﬃculties faced by planning enforcement operational
practice generally and heritage regimes specifically. The utility of the proposed mechanism is that it remedies the current, well
documented, pitfalls of disjointed, piecemeal strategies by providing a framework for robust, coherent decision making not only
in planning but in the wider regulatory arena.
1. Introduction
The legitimacy of the planning system is dependent upon
the eﬃcacious implementation of the planning trinity, which
comprises forward planning, developmentmanagement, and
enforcement [1]. In this context, enforcement has been
repeatedly criticised as being the weakest link in the planning
process [2–5]. Specifically, there is a dearth in appreciation of
the serious problems which pervade the regulatory planning
system. The departure point for this investigation is, there-
fore, to develop a theoretical framework which can be applied
to develop a deeper understanding of inherent problems
which underpin operational practice. The investigation
draws upon a raft of concepts to develop a lens which cannot
only be applied to identify and scrutinise those matters
which are most likely to contribute to solving this complex
equation, but may be of value in the wider regulatory arena.
Nowhere has planning enforcement been more maligned
than in cases where significant breaches of control relate to
conservation matters [6]; and, driven by Prior’s assertion
that “lessons from practice alone risk missing the mark” [3,
page 64], the paper will not only examine the legislative and
policy mechanisms which are used both as a deterrent and
to remedy of breaches relating to conservation, but also it
will analyse the structural factors which provide the cor-
nerstone for the regulatory framework. In the first instance,
the impetus for the investigation is established which sub-
sequently facilitates a discussion on conservation regulatory
mechanisms. Attention then turns to an exploration of
the evolving theoretical framework within which regulatory
control operates, particularly emerging thinking in fields
such as risk-based and really responsive regulation [7, 8].
At each stage, a range of issues will be generated which are
scrutinised in an empirical investigation which spans juris-
dictions in the UK and Ireland. The paper concludes by not
only suggesting how theory can inform practice but makes
suggestions for improvement to the legislative framework
and operational procedure, provides insights into struc-
tural problems which underpin conservation enforcement,
suggests remedies which might be beneficial not only to
planning but other disciplines, and draws attention to issues
of ethics and legitimacy which have far reaching implications
for the planning profession.
The impetus for this investigation has been generated
by evidence that questions the eﬀectiveness of enforcement
practice on conservation matters across the UK. Northern
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Ireland’s (NI’s) built heritage conservation record has been
singled out for particular criticism and consequently pro-
vides an ideal departure point for the study. The Historic
Buildings Council identified unauthorised works undertaken
on listed buildings as a particular area of ineﬀective enforce-
ment as long ago as 1996 [9] and the protection of built
heritage was described in the recent BBC Two television
programme “Restoration” as being bottom of the league in
the UK. Lack of deterrent is the most commonly reported
factor for maintaining this reputation [4] and recent high-
profile examples of this include the illegal demolition of two
listed buildings in Portstewart which resulted in a fine of
just £250 fine per building; while in Bushmills developers
were fined £5, 000 for the unauthorised demolition of, again,
two listed buildings. Such activities continue apace with de
minimis fines issued by the courts when prosecutions are
successful. Indeed, the demolition of the B+ listed Tillie &
Henderson clothing factory in Derry, without prosecution,
adds weight to the hypothesis that there are major inadequa-
cies in the present system.
So far no one has oﬀered comprehensive explanations
as to why the system is not working eﬀectively and why so
many oﬀences against jewels in the conservation crown have
slipped through the enforcement net [10]. It is in this context
that the synergy between theory and practice will provide a
vehicle to scrutinise and contrast the motives, tactics, and
strategies of participants in the regulatory arena.
2. Conservation and Planning
Conservation is one of the core activities in protecting
and enhancing the built environment and its role is to
promote the best architecture, support the restoration of the
townscape fabric through new activity, and suitably develop
vacant sites. Legislation in Great Britain has come a long way
from when it was seen as a means of protecting individual
monuments, to the present day with its current concern for
entire townscapes.
The Ancient Monuments Act 1882 [11] represented
the first government action to protect historic monuments,
and by 1908, three Royal Commissions on the Historical
Monuments of England, Scotland, and Wales had been
established to construct inventories of ancient and historical
monuments. Landmark legislative developments in the form
of the Town and Country Planning Acts of 1944 and 1967
[12, 13] introduced lists of buildings which were thought
worthy of preservation because of their architectural or his-
toric interest and by 1969 legal protection had been provided
to almost 12,000 buildings and nonstatutory recognition, but
not protection, to a further 137,000 [14].
By 1967, however, the Civic Trust [15] pointed out that
the shortfalls of this Act were clear for all to see.
“It is not merely that the machinery sometimes
fails to work, although this is serious enough; it
is that we did not set our sights high enough.
The target we now realise; must be to keep not
just individual buildings scattered here and there
about our towns, but whole town centres, or sub-
stantial parts of them” [page 139].
This wish to conserve entire areas of buildings, and not
only listed ones, was brought about by the recognition that
the amenity of many listed buildings was negatively aﬀected
by changes to the surrounding townscape. Consequently, the
1967 Civic Amenities Act [15] witnessed the beginning of
Conservation Area designation in England and Wales.
Before 1972, NI did not have the provisions available
throughout the rest of the United Kingdom for the listing
of buildings and the designation of Conservation Areas. It
was only with the introduction of the Planning (NI) Order
1972 [16] that such provisions were made available although,
unlike local authorities in England, the power to designate
Conservation Areas was made the direct responsibility of the
Department of the Environment NI (DoENI).
3. Conservation and Enforcement
Planning enforcement is instrumental in ensuring the pro-
tection of our built heritage. The origins of enforcement
as we now know it lie in the Town and Country Planning
Act of 1947 [17]. In NI planning decisions are taken by the
Planning Service (the agency has now been dissolved and
absorbed into the Department of the Environment as
Planning and Local Government Group), which is an agency
within the Department of the Environment, (hereinafter
referred to as the Department) following consultation with
local authority representatives, who, unlike in England, do
not have executive decision making powers. Nevertheless,
NI legislation has largely mirrored its English counterparts
in content and substance. In both NI and England, the
enforcement of planning control is similar, in that discretion
is used to take enforcement proceedings against a breach of
control when it is necessary to do so. Moreover, both systems
recognise that developing without planning permission or in
breach of a consent which has been granted is not, in the first
instance, a criminal oﬀence and that planning permission
may be sought retrospectively. The key mechanisms used to
deal with breaches of control include enforcement notices,
stop and temporary stop notices, as well as breach of
condition notices and injunctions. Exceptions to the non-
criminalisation approach occur when unlawful development
is caught by conservation legislation. Such circumstances
include where unauthorised alterations take place on listed
buildings or any object or structure which lies within the
grounds or curtilage of listed buildings or demolition occurs
in Conservation Areas. In the context of this investigation,
it is timely that a number of new and proposed legislative
mechanisms have been targeted at Scotland and NI which
represent the most significant changes to UK enforcement
since the 1991 Planning and Compensation Act [18].
Case law too plays an important role in conservation
regulation and perhaps the most significant in the context
of this investigation is Shimizu UK Limited v Westminster
City Council (1997) [19] which concerned an application to
demolish part of a listed building and resulted in a judgement
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by the House of Lords which aﬀected listing status. Before
Shimizu, the demolition of a listed building was taken to
cover either its total or partial demolition. The House of
Lords ruled, however, that demolition referred in essence
to the total or substantial destruction of the listed building
and that works relating to the destruction of only part of
the fabric of the building did not amount to demolition. It
also considered that works for the demolition of an unlisted
building in a Conservation Area must also involve the total
or substantial removal of the building concerned, hence
dilution of the Conservation Area regulatory framework as
demolition of part of an unlisted building in a conservation
area does not require conservation area consent.
Paradoxically, NI has an additional layer of conservation
control to other UK regions. These powers enable the
Department to define Areas of Townscape Character (ATCs)
or Areas of Village Character (AVCs), where certain areas
display a distinct character, normally based on their historic
built form and/or layout. This diﬀers from Conservation
Areas, which are given this designation by virtue of their spe-
cial architectural and/or historic interest. It has been argued
that buildings within ATCs/AVCs, although a lesser designa-
tion in policy terms, have in some respects greater protection
than those in a Conservation Area with regard to demolition.
This is because any demolition, partial or otherwise, in an
ATC/AVC, requires permission, as no Shimizu equivalent
challenge on the meaning of demolition of a building has,
as yet, been tested in the courts.
The existing enforcement powers, therefore, in theory,
provide a strong deterrent based toolkit which planners can
employ to remedy breaches of control. Noncompliance with
an enforcement notice, for example, can mean a maximum
fine of up to £20, 000 in England (£100, 000 in NI) and/or
a custodial sentence, while on indictment there is no fine
limitation. Coupled with this, there are powers to impose
subsequent daily fines. No evaluation of the eﬀectiveness of
the enforcement of conservation control would be complete
without also taking into account the role of the courts in
the system’s overall success or shortcomings. As the courts
have been accused of being ill equipped to contend with
the highly complex nature and often seriousness of breaches
of planning control, this research will, therefore, investigate
if anything can be learnt from recent legislative proposals
and, by drawing upon developments in theory, ask whether
alternative strategies can be devised which provide a catalyst
for improved compliance with conservation regulations.
Since the 1991 Planning and Compensation Act, there
have been numerous reviews of enforcement powers, most
notably a Review of Planning Enforcement: Summary and
Recommendations which was published in 2006 [20] (mir-
roring the contents of the Enforcement Strategy (2009)
produced by the Department) [21]. Purdue [22] noted that
the key recommendations are largely directorial in nature,
ranging from the setting of indicators and increasing the
priority of enforcement, to creating guidance on the suitable
level of fines to be included in a good practice guide for
magistrates. Notwithstanding statutory protection, it was
again recommended that unauthorised development should
not, in the first instance, be an oﬀence. Key factors in this
rationale are that unwitting oﬀenders should not be labelled
as criminals nor should the burden of proof be placed upon
the planning authority to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt. In planning the test of evidence is less onerous and
based upon the balance of probability with the burden rest-
ing with the perceived oﬀender. In the Republic of Ireland,
however, a criminalised system has been introduced but the
law has been amended to reverse the burden of proof from
the planning authority to the perceived oﬀender. Whether
such an initiative would be appropriate in the UK will be
investigated later.
While legislative developments are of significant impor-
tance to regulatory conservation matters, it is fundamentally
important to explore the theory behind enforcement prac-
tice, as it is only through an understanding of the structural
underpinning that more eﬀective approaches can be crafted,
which resonate across the wider regulatory spectrum.
4. Regulation Theory and Design
Regulation theory emerged in France in the 1970s as a
critique of neoclassical economic theories and structuralist
approaches [23] and regulation theorists believe answers can
be found in an analysis of the habits and institutional forms
which induce or force agents to behave in ways which are
not antagonistic to the reproduction of structures [24]. In
this context, regulations can, therefore, be defined as the
laws or intervention used to influence or constrain human
behaviour [25] and, while regulation theorists distinguish
between forms of economic and social regulation [26, 27], it
is the latter which is particularly relevant to this investigation.
It is widely documented that regulatory laws alone often
prove ineﬀective in the pursuit of planning control [3, 4].
As such, Baer [28] argues that many of the problems and
diﬃculties of planning enforcement can be related to statute
and regulation design and emphasises the key role of local
organisations and individuals in interpreting and applying
directives in a transparent consistent and proportionate
manner.
With this in mind, Ingram and Schneider [29] argue
there is no single recipe for an eﬀective statute, and instead
smart statutes are designed for the context in which they are
to be implemented. They identify four diﬀerent levels to the
design of regulations. The first of these is the strong or
explicit statute which leaves little or no discretion to the
implementing agency and should be conceptualised through
transparent robust goals and objectives. The second tier
comprises the vaguer statute which, while retaining control
over the goals, allows greater discretion to administrative
agencies. It is apparent that planning enforcement in the UK
falls somewhere between levels one and two [3] as, while a
strong statute exists, a high degree of discretion is allocated
to those closest to the problem who apply the policy. This is
reiterated by Wood and Becker [30]:
“local planning authorities’ policy and decision-
making capacity has been informed rather than
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imposed or dictated by a combination of legisla-
tion, government guidance, and case law inter-
pretations that serve to set the boundaries for the
exercise of discretionary judgement” [page 349].
Tier three in the hierarchy is deemed the grass roots or
bottom-up approach, which leaves interpretation to street
level bureaucrats doing little more than providing agents
with the legal authority to act, while tier four is a support
building approach which places better emphasis on the
processes of policy rather than simply the policy outcomes
or results. It supports the claim that negotiation over desired
outcomes is best achieved by consensus building [3], and it is
mirrored in the work of Lipsky [31] which advocated a con-
sensus building approach, where the relationship between
the regulators and the regulated is of vital importance.
While, in principle, it seems this fourth tier would
represent a Utopian ideal and indeed many of its merits are
imbued in the strategy analysis below, it will be evidenced
that in matters of conservation, that is, what it is likely to
remain.
5. Strategy Analysis
In assessing the eﬀectiveness of enforcement of conservation
control, it is important not only to look at the design of
regulations but also the various techniques used by planning
authorities in their quest for regulatory compliance. Much
debate has surrounded a principles based approach to
regulation which requires moving away from dependence on
detailed, dictatorial rules and relying more on broadly stated
rules or principles to set the standards by which regulates
must comply. Although originally introduced in financial
services regulation in the UK in the 1990s, it will be asked
if such an approach to regulatory design can contribute to
the more eﬀective enforcement of conservation regulation.
Principles based regulation requires regulators to define
the ending that they require regulates to achieve, instead of
focusing on stipulating the processes or actions that regulates
must take. The potential benefits of using principles are that
they provide flexibility, are more likely to produce conduct
which fulfils regulatory objectives, and may be easier to
comply with. Principles, however, lack the certainty and clear
standard of behaviour provided for by detailed rules, exem-
plified in planning enforcement notices. Furthermore, Black
[32, page 108] states that “they can lead to inconsistencies,
are prone to creative compliance and to the need for constant
adjustment to new situations.”
Regulatory strategies for planning control are often con-
sidered under the banners of formal and informal techniques
[5, 27, 33], which Ayres and Braithwaite [34] capture, in
a sanctions pyramid, where actions range from informal
techniques such as education, negotiation and persuasion to
the more formal techniques of warnings, and eventually, at
the apex, prosecution. Ayres and Braithwaite’s [34] respon-
sive approach to regulation and enforcement involves the
adoption of a flexible set of enforcement reactions where
plausible and strong sanctions are generally held in reserve
for the most serious of cases. Actions at one level must work
eﬀectively with other levels, otherwise, there is a risk of
making the whole system dysfunctional and the level of inter-
vention must increase the more an oﬀender fails to comply
with the regulations. Baldwin and Cave [35] highlight this
using a hierarchy of regulatory strategies. At the base of their
hierarchy is self-regulation whereby rules are established and
individuals are expected to comply with them. The next two
tiers of the hierarchy are largely similar to the binary model
of enforcement styles developed by Hutter [36]. One of the
most important elements of Hutter’s binary model compares
to Richardson et al. [37] accommodativeor Hawkins [38]
compliance strategy of enforcement. The aim of this strategy
is to achieve compliance through the correction of existing
problems and the prevention of new ones. While falling
short of support building [29], Claydon and Chick’s [39]
assertion that the role of negotiation can be conducive to
consensus driven, long lasting remedies will be evidenced in
the empirical investigation.
The second element of Hutters binary model is char-
acterised by a “penal” style of enforcement similar to the
deterrent model [31] and Hawkins [38] sanctioning strategy.
Both models aspire to reduce the instance of breaches and
use prosecutions as a means to deter future infringements.
Hutter [36] refined the binary model to include two
new strategies—the first being a persuasive strategy which
involves the education and persuasion of regulatees. The
second is the more stringent insistent strategy comparable to
the third level in Baldwin and Cave’s [35] hierarchy. Under
this strategy, regulators are less likely to negotiate and instead
initiate legal action when faced with continued reluctance to
comply. The top level of Baldwin and Cave’s [35] strategy
pyramid is command regulation which is a last resort for
enforcement oﬃcers. Grekos [40] states how this type of
strategy has come under much criticism as command and
control regimes have been seen by some to be an expensive
method of tackling environmental deviants, with penalties
not always being seen as conducive to compliance and
deterrence goals; while McKay and Ellis [41] echo this
perspective stressing the importance of providing and, where
appropriate, implementing robust deterrent mechanisms.
With the above perspectives in mind, it is interesting to
note how in the UK, responsive regulation has been followed
by risk-based regulation in the wake of the government com-
missioned Hampton Report [42] and the issuing of the Com-
pliance Code and the Principals of Good Regulation [43],
the purpose of which was to reduce administrative burdens
without compromising the regulatory regime. The risk-based
approach refers to an allocation of enforcement resources
based on an assessment of the risks that a regulatee poses
to regulatory goals. The main components of this approach
are appraisals of the risk of noncompliance and calculations
regarding the impact that such activity will have on the
regulator’s capacity to achieve its objectives [7]. Risk-based
approaches are, therefore, important in that they allow
resources to be directed in a way that prioritises highest
risks. Such approaches do, however, give rise to a number
of problems. Risk-based systems require those managing
enforcement teams to decide which risks are most important.
As such, theymust be prepared to deal with the consequences
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of poor decisions [7]. The approach may also fail to
detect new risks and overlook lower levels of risk which, if
numerous, could prove catastrophic, particularly in sensitive
locations where built heritage is concerned. Nonetheless,
many of the merits of such an approach are worthy of investi-
gation, for example, if risk regulation is based upon priori-
tisation, perhaps matters of conservation are high on the
list?
While each of the above concepts generates its own
unique issues, it is interesting to examine the emerging con-
cept of really responsive regulation [8]. This suggests there
are five main tasks of enforcement involving the discovery of
breaches, developing tools for responding to such breaches,
enforcing those tools, gauging their success or failure, and
eventually modifying them accordingly. To be really respon-
sive, “regulation has to be responsive not only to compliance
performance but also to the attitudinal settings of regulatees;
to the institutional environment of regulation; to the opera-
tion and interplay of logics to the diﬀerent regulatory tools
and strategies; to its own performance; to changes to each of
these elements” [8, page 44]. Importantly, really responsive
regulation emphasises the need to deal with “decentred”
regulatory regimes in which regulation is carried out by a
variety of types. Decentred analyses involve a move away
from looking at regulation solely by the state and instead
consider the many people involved in the regulation process.
Conceptually, the decentring approach has a good under-
standing of the nature of the problems of regulation and
the nature of the relationships that comprise the regulatory
regime [44]. It rejects an idea of regulation whereby regu-
latees are assumed to comply with regulations and instead
“problematises the responses of actors to attempts by others
to regulate them.” Strategies are, therefore, required to be
“multifaceted, using a number of strategies simultaneously
or sequentially and indirect” [45, page140]. Importantly, the
attitudinal mindsets of regulatees may have a bearing on the
enforcement strategy used by a regulator and any eventual
success of that strategy. There is a considerable body of
literature to suggest that indeed the attitudinal mindset of
the enforcer may also contribute to the enforcement strategy
employed. How enforcement oﬃcers make decisions is only
partly determined by the rules, be they organisational or
legal. It will be evidenced that organisational norms and
practices [46], past experiences [47], personal relationships,
intuition, and the decision maker’s own perceptions and
attitudes will all play a part in how decisions are made [48],
raising interesting ethical questions for decision takers. In
this context, the ethical basis for the planning profession, as
per the RTPI Code of Conduct [49], is that planners obtain
specialised knowledge and skill sets to serve society and
protect the public interest with honesty and integrity. While
three broad categories of ethics can be identified in virtue,
consequentialist and nonconsequentialist [50], it is perhaps
the second of the three which is most appropriate to this
investigation. This is underpinned by utilitarianism which,
as Taylor [51] points out, aims to maximise good over bad in
the public interest, and, as will be seen later, is driven by the
consequences of decisions rather than the intrinsic motives
and attitudes of the decision taker.
5.1. Regulatory Compliance. Although the various models
provide useful insights into how the issues of enforcement
can be tackled, no study of enforcement would be complete
without considering current thinking on how compliance
might best be achieved in planning. It will become apparent
that by drawing upon key components from this perspective
and synergising these with emerging paradigms, new ideas
can be generated which contribute to our rudimentary
knowledge of regulatory control.
In recent years, there has been much debate over what
is the most eﬀective approach to achieving compliance with
planning regulations [3, 4]. The work of Burby et al. [52] is
useful in identifying and exploring the broader limitations
of institutional capacity in the regulatory process. The
investigation examined the options available to enforcement
agencies when attempting to achieve the objectives of law
and found that there are three main choices open to
enforcement oﬃcers. The first of these focuses on whether to
increase the ability to enforce which is known as systematic
compliance; or whether, secondly, to improve the commit-
ment of developers to comply voluntarily with regulations,
referred to as facilitative compliance. The third choice is
whether to combine elements of both the systematic and
facilitative approaches to form a new enforcement strategy.
The systematic compliance approach assumes that breaches
of regulations are intended and that the majority of perpetra-
tors are aware of the rules and standards. As such, increasing
the capacity to enforce and maximising expectations of dis-
covery of noncompliance, along with the threat of punitive
sanctions is an essential deterrent to potential violation. On
the other hand, facilitative compliance is based upon the
theory that most regulatory breaches are unintended and
carried out due to ignorance. This model is less about the
uncovering and correction of breaches and instead entails
creating conditions whereby people are more aware of reg-
ulations through education and negotiation. In addition to
the use of incentives to promote compliance, Burby et al.
[52] make a number of recommendations to support their
facilitative philosophy. These include the following:
(i) an adequate number of technically competent staﬀ,
(ii) strong proactive leadership,
(iii) adequate legal support, and
(iv) a consistently strong eﬀort to check building and
development plans, inspect building and develop-
ment sites, and provide technical assistance.
Burby et al. [52] alternative perspective provides an excel-
lent framework within which to evaluate the enforcement
regimes in both NI and England. Indeed, “recognition of the
scope of alternative approaches has important implications
for understanding the “enforcement gap” between the inten-
tions of statutory powers and their use in practice” [3, page
66].
It is, therefore, apparent that there is an extensive and
emerging range of thematic approaches which purport to
influence regulatory control: the real complexity of the
matter is identifying which is best in specific circumstances.
What is apparent is that each concept generates a raft of issues
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worthy of investigation and while what might be considered
an environmental commodification of regulation theory is
unlikely to emerge as the remedy to the conservation con-
undrum, it may be possible to provide an insight into mech-
anisms, tactics, and strategies which could prove beneficial to
operational practice and procedure in conservation control
and beyond.
6. The Research Approach
The methodology employed to facilitate this research was
triangulation based [53] involving a combination of primary
and secondary sources. The review of secondary informa-
tion, which included literature, legislation, and policy gener-
ated a raft of issues relating to statue design, strategy, ethics,
legislation and operational practice. These issues provided
the framework for the research instrument which was a
semistructured questionnaire containing a list of issues for
discussion. These were themed to explore the concerns raised
and, depending on the respondent’s knowledge and experi-
ence, considered the role of participants and the responsi-
bilities with which they are challenged. As a thematic guide,
it enabled the researcher to target areas of expertise and
develop a deeper understanding of the research problems.
Furthermore, it provided latitude to probe beyond the
answers and engage in dialogue with the interviewee.
The empirical investigation was conducted in two key
phases. Phase one comprised three strands. Strand one took
the form of semi-structured interviews, strand two ques-
tionnaire surveys, while strand 3 consisted of follow-up dis-
cussions to develop matters emerging from the preceding
strands. The research, which was endorsed at the outset and
subsequently evaluated by the Planning Service in NI, was
mainly conducted in each of the six NI Divisional Planning
Oﬃces (DPOs) and with six local planning authorities in
England. The English authorities were selected on the basis
of geographic location: two from the North, two from the
Midlands, and two from the South of England. The target
population for Phase 1 comprised planning enforcement
oﬃcers with at least two years experience in the area of
conservation enforcement. A planning oﬃcer from each
grade (principal/senior/planner/planning assistant) was
interviewed in each case meaning that, in total, 48 oﬃcers
were surveyed, plus two representatives from the Ulster
Architectural Heritage Society (UAHS) and one each from
the Heritage Society and SAVE Britain’s Heritage. In addi-
tion, to these discussions were conducted with six private
sector planning professionals and four developers. The
strand two questionnaire surveys targeted the public sector
interviewees and enabled issues which emerged in the course
of the discussions to be developed more extensively. Strand
three comprised a round of additional semistructured dis-
cussions with key respondents, to provide clarification on a
number of outstanding matters.
In Phase 2, on completion of the data collection and
analysis, two focus groups were established comprising
professional practitioners in both the public (5) and private
sector (6) plus 4 developers with experience of conservation
related planning matters (Table 1). Prior to commencement,
Table 1: Survey population.
Professional planners Public sector 48
Professional planners Private sector 6
UAHS Nongovernmental organisation 2
SAVE Nongovernmental organisation 1
Heritage society Voluntary 1
Developers Private sector 4
Total 62
each participant was provided with briefing papers to act as
discussion arenas around which the research findings were
evaluated. The sessions provided an opportunity to consider
and validate information gleaned, reflect on feedback based
upon perceptions of protagonists, and draw conclusions
which could be linked to operational practice.
6.1. Statute Design. Prior [3] suggests that advice on the
carrying out of regulation is often contradictory as a result of
the allocation of discretion within statutes, while Baer [28]
considers that the problems of achieving compliance with
planning regulations relate to their design. In this context,
all public sector respondents stated that they have little
input into the design process and none disagreed that the
existing system rests between the strong and vaguer statute as
identified by Prior [3]. Indeed, it was asked in the evaluation
process if there was a need to rethink the regulatory planning
structure. Opinion was mixed, but most believed that the
current design has the potential to combine flexibility with
a relative degree of certainty. The weaknesses in the system
were perceived to lie more with operational practice than
regulatory design. It must, however, be stressed that this
was not a unanimous opinion as it was also argued that
a reframing of the regulatory relationship from one largely
underpinned by directing and controlling may prove useful.
This reverberates with the comments of Black [45], “that
regulators and regulatees move from a directing relationship of
telling and doing, to a relationship in which regulators com-
municate their goals and adopt a self-reflexive approach to the
development of processes and practices to ensure that these goals
are substantively met, and critically, both trust each other to
fulfil their side of this new regulatory bargain” (page 430).
Such a principles based approach requires the establish-
ment of outcomes to be achieved, not in-depth procedures
for achieving them, thus allowing greater room for local or
grassroots modification. It is not without criticism however,
as it could be seen as a way for regulatees to do whatever
they want. This view is reinforced by the department’s policy
stance on enforcement which states, that
“The Department has a general discretion to take
enforcement action against a breach of planning
control when it regards it as expedient to do so”
[54, page 7].
This clearly leaves substantial room for interpretation,
although interestingly an exception to this stance is the policy
relating to demolition of listed buildings, which states
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“where either of the following actions are under-
taken: (a) the unauthorised demolition of a listed
building; or (b) the unauthorised demolition of
an unlisted building within a conservation area;
the department will normally pursue direct court
action” [54, page15].
Finally, in this context, a significant proportion of
respondents considered the discretionary nature of planning
enforcement to be problematic. This is surprising, in view
of the policy direction in relation to built heritage, which
indicates limited room for discretion in terms of enforcement
options. The majority of those highlighting the problematic
nature of discretionary powers were public sector planners
from NI one of whom stated “discretion fosters inconsistent
approaches.” These views raise the following questions:
firstly, have the broader discretionary powers relating to
general planning enforcement activities been inappropriately
applied to breaches relating to built heritage and conserva-
tion; secondly, has this situation transpired because of the
action of individual planners, or is it the prevailing culture
within planning oﬃces that is leading to the inconsistent
application of policy? In this context, it is interesting that
the interviewees from UAHS (2) believe “the discretionary
nature of planning is dangerous, especially where buildings
of architectural and historic interest are concerned, as some
oﬃcers are more likely than others to grasp the severity of
breaches and pursue prosecutions.”
6.2. Strategies of Regulation. Understanding how enforce-
ment oﬃcers exercise their functions is vital to an under-
standing of how any regulatory system operates, as regulation
is not a creation of legislators or those who write the rules,
rather it is the outcome of interactions between regulators
and regulatees. In the first instance, therefore, attention turns
to a review of the strategies employed by enforcement oﬃcers
in undertaking their work on matters of conservation.
Planning decision-makers are eﬀectively faced with a
choice between deterrence based approaches based on sanc-
tioning and compliance strategies, which are bargaining and
negotiation driven. Enforcement oﬃcers may, however, gain
compliance with the law, not merely by resort to formal
enforcement action and prosecution, but by using a host of
informal techniques including education, advice, persuasion,
and negotiation [35]. The trick to successful regulation,
according to Ayres and Braithwaite [34] is to establish a syn-
ergy between punishment and persuasion. Likewise the work
of Hutter [36] revealed how enforcement relates not only
to sanctioning, but also to a string of mechanisms under-
pinned by collaboration and negotiation. The binary model
identified a progression of approach between the two extrem-
ities of compliance and deterrence with the compliance
approach further separated into “persuasive” and “insistent”
strategies based on the willingness to use sanctions. The
pyramids work on a slope of severity, so the more reluctant
the regulatee is to comply, the higher they find themselves on
the slope of the pyramids and hence will be subject to the
more serious strategies and sanctions. Conversely, provisions
are made at the bottom of the pyramid for unwitting oﬀend-
ers who are willing to comply and thus no sanctioning is
necessary. In between, the persuasive strategy uses measures
short of sanctions such as education to achieve compliance.
The findings from the investigation, in line with the
framework put forward by Hutter, were that the choice
for enforcement oﬃcers should not be whether to adopt
a facilitative or sanction-based enforcement strategy, but
rather to choose the appropriate action within a progressive
two-sided enforcement model matched to the regulatee. The
majority of enforcement oﬃcers concurred with the words of
one respondent, from NI, who stated “even on conservation
matters, facilitation through negotiation and persuasion
should be explored initially and prosecution should be
the last resort,” whilst an overwhelming proportion of res-
pondents supported the combination of facilitation and
sanction-based approaches to cater for all types of enforce-
ment breaches.
Only 6 of the 48 public sector respondents perceived
sanction-based strategies to be the most eﬀective enforce-
ment style for serious breaches of conservation control,
which at best represents a very limited endorsement of
Hawkins’[38] belief that prosecutions are more likely to be
pursued when infringements are flagrant. This view is under-
standable within the context of broad planning enforcement,
however, it is at odds with the department’s articulated policy
in relation to conservation matters, where it “will normally
pursue court action” [54, page 15]. This raises the question,
is there a widely held misunderstanding among planning
oﬃcers regarding the diﬀering enforcement policy stances in
relation to conservation matters and, if so, are they applying
an inappropriate enforcement strategy of negotiation and
persuasion in dealing with these matters when a more
sanction-based approach is the policy directive?
Whichever enforcement strategy is deployed in the inter-
actions between regulators and regulatees the decision maker
must be cognisant of issues such as transparency, consistency,
and proportionality. These matters are pertinent as they
can act as impediments to the eﬃcacy of enforcement acti-
vity, and in this context, it is interesting to note that the
implementation of a proportionate, risk-based approach to
regulation was advocated in the Barker Review of Land Use
Planning [55].
However, as pointed out by one of the public sector
planners from England (this insight is interesting as Envi-
ronmental Health in England is, unlike in NI, with planning
a function of local government), “the planning profession
is not alone in having accusations of inconsistency or of
either lax or over-zealous enforcement laid against it. Other
local government regulatory services such as Environmental
Health have had similar criticisms made but have used
the provisions of the Enforcement Concordat Guidelines
[56] as a basis to develop local organisational enforcement
policies.” These policies set out to ensure that the enforce-
ment decisions are considered within the guiding principles
of consistency, fairness, proportionality, transparency, and
objectivity. This approach ensures that oﬃcers take decisions
relating to enforcement action within a specified framework
designed to bring a degree of consistency to the process.
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It also facilitates elected members being given all the relevant
information required to come to a decision in relation to
legal action, in a consistent manner. In addition, this frame-
work ensures that the information is provided in a manner
which makes it less likely that irrelevant considerations can
be brought into the decision-making process, thus reducing
the probability of perverse decisions being arrived at. This
has the benefit of avoiding accusations of decisions being
made amounting to instances of Wednesbury Unreasonable-
ness. The publication of enforcement policies articulating the
use of this framework, usually on Council websites, has also
countered criticisms that these services operate in a veiled
and inconsistent manner in relation to enforcement. Despite
its applicability to planning, only a small minority of res-
pondents were aware of the Enforcement Concordat’s exis-
tence and there was an almost total dearth of knowledge as
to its content.
6.3. Tactics, Legitimacy, and Ethics. Findings from the inves-
tigation indicate that there is disparate application of formal
enforcement powers between authorities. There appears to
be a greater reluctance by enforcement oﬃcers to use formal
action in the North of England and parts of NI, a finding
supported by the research of Claydon and Chick [39] which
revealed both wide-ranging discretionary opportunity and
significant variation in practice among authorities surveyed.
Moreover, the study exposed contrasting attitudes amongst
senior planners as to how discretion should be applied and
the constraints upon it. A number of possible explanations
were put forward, the main one being, as explained by one
NI public sector planner, “there is a general reluctance by
those managing enforcement teams to venture down formal
routes.” This corroborates the findings of Hood et al. [57]
that the organisational culture, and socialisation into the
norms of the organisation, play an exceptionally strong role
in aﬀecting the type of enforcement approach an oﬃcer is
likely to take. This is further mirrored in the work of Hutter
and Manning [58] who suggest the pattern of enforcement
is, at least in part,
“a result of the dialectic between management
with their concern for overall performance and
organisational mandate, middle management
whose aim it is to control the practices of inspec-
tors, and the inspectors who are inclined to see
their task as exercising an immediate face-to-face
responsibility and resolving culpability on their
particular patch” [page 127].
A small number of interviewees (7) discussed a shift from
professionalism towards practices dominated by perfor-
mance indicators which has aﬀected the strategies employed
when undertaking enforcement duties. Oﬃcers in both
jurisdictions described a constant pressure to close as many
enforcement cases as possible in line with targets and as such,
less serious breaches were often left to go by the wayside,
sometimes with “serious detriment to matters of conserva-
tion import.” This supports the findings of Campbell and
Marshall [59] who found that a number of altered circum-
stances were giving rise to unease over the ways in which
decisions were being motivated by needs rather than reflect-
ing planning considerations. Again this raises serious ques-
tions in terms of legitimate decision making by professional
practitioners and infers conflict with the professional Code
of Conduct [49] of the planning profession where the
overarching objective is to make decisions, with honesty and
integrity, in the public interest.
Some respondents in England also attributed a reluctance
to use formal enforcement action to “pressure from elected
representatives to progress in ways at odds with those
recommended.” This reverberates with findings by Simmons
[60] who suggests that the involvement of elected members
in the planning process presents very diﬃcult ethical issues;
while Baldwin [61] states that there is a fundamental tension
between the notion of regulatory action in the public
interest and the reality that regulators have to live with their
political masters. In this context, again, serious questions
might be asked about the legitimacy of the decision-making
process [62]. Specifically, are the motives and strategies of
those empowered through the democratic process sometimes
questionable and does this, in turn, put professional oﬃcers
in diﬃcult positions when they perceive the evidence-base
for taking decisions is less than robust? The key point is
that, as stressed in the seminal work of Marcuse [63] and
Mizzoni [64], while planners have a duty of care to their
employer, they have a duty to dissent when they believe that
their actions would not be “for the benefit of the public” [49,
page 6].
In a similar context, the evidence inferred that enforce-
ment oﬃcers’ own perceptions play a role in the strategies
they apply to cases of noncompliance. Although a number
of interviewees were hesitant to answer the question, oﬃcers
in lower grades were more open and frank about how this
operates in practice. The majority agreed that their personal
past experiences, perceptions, and attitudes always or occa-
sionally influenced the strategy they were likely to adopt.
Interestingly, the majority of the remainder who considered
this never to be the case were largely higher ranking prin-
cipal or senior enforcement oﬃcers. Significantly, only one
interviewee argued that all of his team “are professionals
dealing with each case on its individual merits and, as such,
not allowing personal opinions to have any bearing on overall
decision-making.”
The opinion that individual oﬃcers’ attitudes and values
have no influence on decision-making contradicts previous
research which has found that the perceptions enforcement
oﬃcers have of regulatees and the nature of their relationship
with them are key factors in determining the enforcement
strategy adopted [65]. With this in mind, Greasley [46] find
it surprising that the ethic of impartiality is still profoundly
embedded in conceptions of the planning oﬃcer’s profes-
sional role. Follow-up interviews with public sector respon-
dents concurred with the comments of one of the English
based planners that “while oﬃcers were more likely to use
a facilitative approach if they have had no previous dealings
with the oﬀender, they are more likely to precipitate towards
sanction-based approaches for persistent oﬀenders.” The key
issue in this context is that while this may be legitimate,
it only remains so as long as the strategy adopted is targeted at
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remedying the problem and not influenced by any personal
feelings towards the perceived oﬀender. If a decision is based
upon personal attitudes or motivated by career progression
opportunism, the ethical boundary has been crossed and,
while such activities cannot be explicitly policed by the
profession, it must be cognisant that such problems exist
and endeavour to nurture a culture which strives to eradicate
such practice.
6.4. Really Responsive and Risk Regulation in Practice. An
additional layer of knowledge was provided in discourse with
UAHS and SAVE representatives where opinion was firstly,
that conservation breaches are not taken as seriously as they
should and, secondly, that a willingness to be facilitative at
the early stages of the enforcement process has led to the loss
of some important buildings of architectural and historic
merit which might have been saved if, as one respondent
explained “appropriate enforcement strategies had been
adopted.” Enforcement activity in relation to listed buildings
was perceived by one of the representatives from UAHS
as being “slow and inadequate, with oﬃcers often being
persuaded to accept inappropriate modifications to listed
buildings during negotiations with developers, rather than
taking a firm enforcement stance.” Of the total target survey
population, the majority felt that where a listed building
or conservation breach occurs, enforcement oﬃcers should
move towards formal action at the early stages to ensure it
sends out the right message that such breaches will not be
tolerated.
These issues were taken up in the evaluation process
where it was agreed that deterrent strategies are the most
eﬀective mechanism on conservation matters. Interestingly,
it was mooted by one senior professional planner that “a
decentred [32] partnership approach could foster the devel-
opment of a really responsive approach [8] to regulation
on conservation matters.” It was suggested by one of the
respondents from UAHS that “coordinated contributions
from willing volunteers, for example, Nongovernmental
Organisations (NGOs), local community, and conservation
groups in tandem with conservation oﬃcers and enforce-
ment oﬃcers could increase the knowledge base available on
site specific conservation issues. Such knowledge could even
be translated to datasets and, where appropriate, mapped
with images using Geographical Information Systems (GISs).
The enriched knowledge base could act as a tool to gauge
the severity of problems, enable appropriate strategies to
be identified, and ensure prioritised coordinated action.” In
eﬀect, in identifying and coupling these strands, the focus
group crafted a process which knits succinctly with the really
responsive construct [8].
Prioritisation infers risk and, consequently, risk-regu-
lation also emerged as important in the evaluation process.
The point wasmade by 12 respondents that amajor weakness
in the planning system per se is the monitoring of approvals.
Evidence that monitoring is implemented rigorously was
disparate, with the general feeling that it was often piecemeal
and incremental. The suggestion was made by one private
sector respondent that “the scattergun approach was less
than eﬀective and that greater consideration might be made
to a form of risk assessment to make better use of resources,”
whilst a senior oﬃcial from NI suggested “that monitoring
for compliance could be prioritised and targeted at matters
of greatest significance with the most important cases
specifically identified as major, sensitive and conservation
related forms of development.”
6.5. Criminalisation. Whilst, in theory, if regulations relating
to conservation control are broken, legislative action can be
taken which may result in criminal prosecution, the survey
findings indicated that this is the exception rather than the
rule, particularly in NI. Indeed, it was significant that it
was here that there was the greatest diﬀerential in responses
between respondents from NI, and England. In NI there
was consensus with one respondent that “that there is a
dearth of will to prosecute, a dearth which is exacerbating
daily as resources are cut and planning senior management
seem to consistently make economic arguments in support
of the oﬀenders.” Conversely in England, as one respondent
explained, “prosecutions could be higher but intervention
and pressure from powerful organisations like English
Heritage (English Heritage is funded by Government and is
empowered to deliver heritage protection in England—no
such body exists in NI.) means that a substantive number of
cases are followed through in the courts.”
Interestingly, Hawkins [38] asserts that noncompliance
may be institutionally organised, a perspective supported by
the provisions of the Enforcement Concordat [56], the Regu-
latory ReformAct 2001 [66] and the Regulatory Enforcement
and Sanctions Act 2008 [67], which, combined, advocate
reducing red tape and applying a light-touch approach to
breaches of control. It was also suggested by a number of
respondents, in the first round of discussions, that criminali-
sation would be to the detriment of the existing enforcement
system by increasing staﬀ workload. Moreover, as one pro-
fessional planner went on to explain “criminalisation would
involve all breaches of planning control, including those of a
frivolous nature, resulting in small cases, previously resolved
through negotiation and persuasion, being brought to court.
As such, unwitting oﬀenders could acquire a criminal
record”. Such a rationale does not, however, demand the
imposition of a noncriminalised framework. Significantly,
discretionary strategies mirror practice in other legislative
areas where mala prohibita (strict liability) applies, as there is
invariably an option to apply discretion where it is not in the
public interest to prosecute. Perhaps, therefore, the option of
criminalisation should not be immediately dismissed, as such
an approach would still protect unwitting oﬀenders from
acquiring criminal records.
The second major strand to this debate is underpinned
by the burden of proof and test of evidence. The research
evaluation process considered this matter in detail and, while
it was considered unreasonable to place the onus of proving
beyond reasonable doubt on planning authorities [20], the
remedy implemented in the Republic of Ireland, where a
legislative twist reverses onus to the perceived oﬀender, was
deemed worthy of further investigation. The findings from
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the investigation infer that there is a dichotomy in think-
ing between enforcement oﬃcers working in practice and
policymakers who have consistently rejected criminalisation.
An overwhelming majority of respondents felt, as one
respondent from the Heritage Society explained, “that there
should be greater use of criminalisation for conservation
breaches” whilst the vast majority of these were supportive
of criminalisation across the board. The thinking behind this
was, as explained by one of the senior English respondents,
“if there was blanket criminalisation, the knowledge of
certain prosecution would deter vexatious oﬀending, reduce
enforcement case loads andmost importantly, reduce the risk
to built heritage.”
6.6. The Role of the Courts. There was almost absolute con-
sensus among respondents that the role of the courts is
imperative in the imposition of deterrent based strategies.
It is usually the Magistrates Court which determines the
most appropriate sanction to be applied and, in this context,
the findings reflected the well-documented criticisms which
have been targeted at the judiciary. Interestingly, the findings
resonated with the comments of one UAHS respondent who
stated “sanctions taken are not proportionate to economic
benefits realised by violators.” These comments mirror the
findings of Grekos [40] who found that oﬀenders accrue ben-
efit from compliance deficit. In a similar context, the major-
ity of respondents agreed that the courts do not sentence
at levels commensurate with the severity of oﬀences, con-
sequently suggesting that there is, in eﬀect, no deterrent.
This is of particular concern in conservation matters, as
evidenced in the Portstewart and Bushmills cases. These
findings endorse the oft-expressed opinion [1, 41] that the
Magistrates Court is sometimes overly protective of private
property rights and hence less likely to apply the law to
its maximum eﬀect. The majority of respondents perceived
the penalties imposed by the courts to be inconsistent and
inadequate, with comments that the courts typically impose
a fine, that is, 20% to 30% of the maximum, though statis-
tics show that in many recent NI cases the penalties have
been even lower. The emerging picture was, however,
disparate with, for example, Magistrates in Bromley and Bath
imposing fines considered to reflect the breach, particularly
in conservation matters, while in NI perceptions were that
only magistrates in one of the twenty-six district council
areas which comprise the jurisdiction, Newtownards, were
prepared to impose financial penalties which might be
construed as deterrents.
6.7. Resourcing. Inadequate staﬃng of enforcement in both
England and NI has been a recurring issue and according
to research findings by Prior [3] and McKay [5] a lack of
manpower has time and time again been blamed for the
ineﬀectiveness of the enforcement process. Whilst dedicated
enforcement teams have been in local authorities for some
time, this is in contrast to the Department where this is
a more recent phenomenon. Indeed, McKay [5] found that
almost all participants were employed mainly in develop-
ment control (management) and there were no separate
enforcement teams. In NI, there has since been a paradigm
shift and there are now distinct enforcement teams in each
DPO and in Planning Headquarters. There are now over 50
personnel, equating to approximately 8% of the staﬀ com-
plement, allocated to enforcement duties throughout NI. In
spite of this significant increase in staﬀ, all Planning Service
staﬀ questioned in NI felt they had inadequate numbers,
in contrast to just two respondents in England who agreed
with this statement (since completion of the investigation
staﬃng levels in both jurisdictions have experienced drops
in enforcement staﬃng levels).
With the literature placing such an emphasis on staﬀ
numbers, it is interesting to note that the local authorities in
England, who generally have least issue with the legal frame-
work and behaviour of the Courts, are most content with
enforcement and have fewer staﬀ pro rata than the Depart-
ment. This would suggest then that there is no direct corre-
lation between the number of oﬃcers employed and eﬀective
enforcement but would indicate that this may be due to
some other factor. With this in mind almost all respondents
in both jurisdictions specified that there is a need for greater
training provisions for the technical aspects of enforcement.
While all respondents stated that formal enforcement train-
ing is provided, it was made clear that this has not been
suﬃcient to equip oﬃcers, especially those in the lower
grades, with the necessary skills to carry out their role. One
recent welcome improvement to the system of knowledge
provision in NI has been the introduction of an enforcement
practice manual. Interestingly, such a resource did not seem
to be utilised in the English authorities yet the majority
of respondents in that jurisdiction considered that the
employment of an enforcement manual would help over-
come problems emanating from the highly technical nature
of enforcement. Interestingly, only a small minority of res-
pondents from England expressed knowledge of the National
Association for Planning Enforcement (NAPE) and the exis-
tence of an NAPE enforcement handbook, raising concerns
over communication and knowledge sharing in planning
practice.
Perhaps another factor impacting on eﬃcacy and reflect-
ing the staﬃng concerns of respondents in NI relates to time
in post. Burby et al. [52] point to a need for experienced staﬀ
in the discipline of enforcement yet the evidence emerging
from this investigation was that 22 of the 24 of oﬃcers
surveyed in NI have been working in enforcement for less
than 5 years as opposed to 12 of the 24 oﬃcers in England.
In the case of NI, oﬃcers generally only see working in
enforcement as a transient part of their career, indeed
staying too long in post is perceived as detrimental to career
development. Indeed, it was agreed that that this perception
results in high turnover rates, as staﬀ seek to develop their
career elsewhere within the organisation, and consequently
many staﬀ do not have time to build up high levels of
expertise.
6.8. Reactive versus Proactive Enforcement. The Review of
Planning Enforcement in England [68] has shown that
enforcement remains a resource poor and a low priority
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function, again confirming the enforcement role as the
Cinderella of the planning system. The end result of such
insuﬃcient resources is a system, that is, as suggested by
Burby et al. [52], largely reactive as opposed to proactive. The
consequence of such a resource deficit is a process which
responds to neighbours’ complaints instead of actively pur-
suing the more serious breaches of planning control. The
research findings concur with the findings of McKay [5] that
enforcement in NI and in the majority of local authorities
in England is reactive. The feelings of the majority of public
sector planning professionals were reflected in the comments
of one NI professional who stated “rather than proac-
tively identifying serious breaches of conservation control,
resources are often devoted to frivolous cases where com-
plaints have been lodged. Frequently these emerge as a result
of neighbour disagreements and rivalry, but enforcement
oﬃcers are pressurised to focus on these as opposed to more
serious breaches of planning control, particularly when the
complainant has the support of an elected representative.” If
this is true, it raises ethical challenges for professionals as they
must not succumb to pressure to spend inordinate amounts
of time and resources on such matters solely to appease
complainants or fearing criticism by those in a position of
power.
The findings from this investigation indicate that author-
ities which employ amore proactive approach,monitor plan-
ning permissions, and look for breaches of planning control
are more eﬀective, particularly with regard to conservation
matters, again endorsing the findings of Burby et al. [52].
Follow-up interviews with respondents highlighted that Bath
and Bromley are largely proactive and havemonitoring teams
that keep files on every listed building and conservation
area. These are monitored regularly and updated with photo-
graphic records, meaning that breaches can be detected and
evaluated at an early stage, thus reducing the risk of serious
detriment to the built heritage. The point was also made by
one respondent that “potential oﬀenders are cognisant that
the region is being rigorously policed and similarly aware
that vexatious flouting of the regulations will result in severe
punitive sanctions,” suggesting that a coordinated approach
with experienced staﬀ and support of the courts is eﬀective.
7. Conclusion
Despite recent reviews there appears to be a dearth of under-
standing of the substantive aspects of planning enforcement
practice and procedure which has far reaching implications
for regulatory compliance generally and conservation mat-
ters in particular. The departure point for this investigation
was therefore to demonstrate how the theory of regulation
can be applied to develop a deeper understanding of the
inherent problems which underpin operational practice and,
accordingly, it has been demonstrated that these constructs
can indeed be employed as a praxis. The investigation has
drawn upon a raft of concepts to develop a lens which can
be applied to identify and scrutinise those matters which are
most likely to contribute to solving this complex equation.
Specifically, the conceptual framework can enable planners
to employ a coherent, strategic approach in identifying and
investigating core problems, as opposed to the existing scat-
tergun approach which is typically piecemeal, disjointed, and
incremental. The corollary of this is that the application of
theory to practice, manifested in the empirical investigation,
has enabled key questions to be asked and yielded rich
information in terms of problematising operational practice
and identifying potential remedies.
In this context, the broad brush reference to deterrence-
based strategies coupled with negotiation is underpinned
by an ethos which is strongly supportive of target setting
and establishing deadlines [20]. While such practices may
foster expediency, the research findings raise questions over
whether hastening to close cases and meet oﬃce deadlines
can backfire, resulting in increased levels of environmental
damage, particularly in areas of greatest sensitivity. Similarly,
the evidence suggests that the much heralded negation
approach often results in a less than optimum outcome.
Such concerns are reflected in the DoENI guidelines [21] for
enforcement practice which do not mention conservation as
an enforcement priority, further evidence of undervaluing
conservation? Burby et al. [52] point about well trained and
resourced teams which conduct monitoring exercises was
endorsed, and one lesson from NI is that increased staﬃng
levels is not enough to improve eﬃcacy per se, as there is no
substitute for well-trained experienced staﬀ. This has impli-
cations for career professional planners who require expe-
rience of multiple roles and not just enforcement, hence a
desire to learn the basics and move to a diﬀerent specialism
within the discipline. More significantly, it has detrimental
implications for planning enforcement as rarely will staﬀ be
in place long enough to develop highly specialised skill sets
and penetrative knowledge of one of the most complex areas
of planning practice.
In terms of instrumental tinkering, it is clear that there
is strong support for deterrent mechanisms when dealing
with conservation enforcement matters. Does one answer to
increasing eﬃcacy lie in higher fines or greater education
and guidance for magistrates? The evidence suggests both,
though Mushal [69] advises that both of these have been
done in America with limited success. It does, however, seem
that there is strong support for some legislative strengthen-
ing, for example, recrafting the framework to remedy the
perceived damage resulting from the Shimizu ruling [19].
The evidence also suggests that previous reviews of
enforcement have neglected to target the full suite of implica-
tions generated by the concept of criminalisation. That is not
to say that it is the most appropriate pathway to follow, but
there is merit in exploring the potential oﬀered by options
presented by reverse onus within the parameters of the
Human Rights Act 1998 [70]. A strong statute [29] approach
would not, per se, preclude discretion but, similarly, may
signpost the emergence of a culture which rejects persuasive
practice [36]. Support building [29] may not be an option
due to the proliferation of those who flagrantly flout reg-
ulations, of particular importance in conservation sensitive
locations and, consequently, regulation design must be
conceptualised as a matter of balance. Responsive regulation
[34] provides flexibility enabling top down deterrence to
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harmonise with bottomup negotiation and, consequently,
requires a robust operational framework. Principles based
approaches [32], however, may not be suited to such a frame-
work as the procedural nature of prosecution is dependent
upon providing oﬀenders with clear guidance on how to
remedy breaches, in the interests of avoiding inconsistencies
in approach. While an element of risk regulation is inevitable
due to the inordinate number of enforcement cases generated
and future fiscal constraint, the evidence suggests that really
responsive, decentred approaches [8] can contribute sub-
stantively to designing a conservation regulatory regime,
as the constructs weave succinctly with the cultural fabric
usually found in Conservation Areas. The Bath and Bromley
case studies evidence how appropriately trained, experienced
staﬀ can work eﬀectively with partner organisations, NGOs,
and volunteer interest groups; and, when complemented by a
willingness of the courts to apply sanctions to the maximum,
the outputs are impressive. On matters of conservation there
are ready made partners who will willingly police sub-
regions, the technology is in place to formulate datasets
and GIS maps can foster the construction of a substantive
evidence base to better inform decision making. Whether
such decisions are legitimate and ethical remains another
matter.
Perhaps, however, the most important structural finding
from this investigation is one which is of deeper significance,
relates to attitudinal responses and which has only been
addressed superficially in discussions of really responsive
approaches to date. Attitudinal approaches of professional
practitioners presents serious ethical challenges to the indi-
vidual. Impartiality forms the cornerstone of the RTPI
Professional Code of Conduct [49] and while practitioners
are bound to discharge their duty to their employers with
due care and diligence, they must remain cognisant of their
overarching duty to the public interest. As such they must
take a utilitarian stance and not be influenced by personal
like or dislike for perceived oﬀenders but focussed upon
an outcome for the common good. Similarly, they must be
prepared to speak fearlessly in the face of adversity albeit
when it means dissenting from the desires of those in higher
positions of power, risking consequences which may ulti-
mately be detrimental to their career progression. In this
context, external policing of misconduct is procedurally
impossible, but cognisance that such behaviour is unaccept-
able is imperative. Worryingly, a number of respondents
stated that they prefer to remain silent rather than express
their discontent with an enforcement decision by superiors.
Planners must be prepared to “speak truth to power” or
inevitably the discipline will be faced with a crisis of both
truth and trust which will undermine the legitimacy of the
entire planning profession.
In conclusion, whilst it is clear that there is much to
learn in terms of operational practice for built heritage
protection, useful lessons can be learnt which are of relevance
not only to planning enforcement but the wider regula-
tory arena, particularly with regard to how really respon-
sive approaches can foster the development of new instru-
ments in the form of legislative toolkits, technologically
driven risk-based monitoring and collaborative approaches
underpinned by transparency, consistency, and proportion-
ality. At a more substantive level, it is clear that theory
informs practice. It enables decision makers to divorce
themselves from micromanagement and view institutional
and operational frameworks in their entirety. Whilst the
enforcement equation remains complex, recognition of the
need for synergy between normative modelling and instru-
mentalism is imperative. Theory and practice are inextrica-
bly linked and it is only though recognition of the need to
develop this dynamic that our rudimentary knowledge of
planning enforcement dynamics will begin to grow.
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